The article examines foreign investment in Slovenia to study the interplay between global investment flows, pressures from regional associations, and national protectionist efforts and resistance to foreign ownership. Using content analysis of policies and parliamentary debates, the author investigates how the newly established Slovenian state institutionalizes its attitudes toward the participation of foreigners in the national economy in the official policies adopted to regulate foreign investment. With case studies of foreign investment transactions, the author illustrates how foreign investment occurs in practice. The author finds that the Slovenian state officials negotiate the domestic and European Union pressures by sanctioning the decoupling between formal policies and economic practice. At the organizational level, economic actors involved in transactions negotiate the global and local interests by exploiting institutional nontransparency and differentiating between transaction partners on the basis of preexistent social relations and cultural affinities. Paying attention to the intersection between global, regional, and national forces, this study uncovers the social, cultural, and political bases of economic processes and the agency of local actors in responding to global and regional pressures.
Introduction
According to World Investment Report, annual world foreign direct investment (FDI) investment passed the $800 billion level, marking a twentyfold increase since 1970. 2 These figures undeniably point to an increasingly vast amount of capital moving across national borders, as part and parcel of economic globalization.
Many scholars have investigated the consequences of economic globalization and FDI, focusing on its positive as well as negative effects for national economies. The modernization school and neoclassical economics emphasize that FDI is a vehicle of modernization of the less developed world and thus beneficial for domestic economies. 3 On the other hand, world systems theorists argue that FDI serves primarily the investor, usually Western core economies, and thus further halts the development of poorer countries on the periphery. 4 Focused on the consequences of global investment flows for national economies, scholars have paid insufficient attention to the process of foreign investment. In particular, we have scant knowledge on how local responses structure global flows. While researchers have documented antiglobalization movements, 5 less is known about how national state and organizational actors resist global pressures. In terms of foreign investment, it is unlikely that any country in the contemporary global economy would or even can isolate itself from establishing connections to multinational companies. Hence, the response to economic globalization can be seen as a continuous negotiation between global investment pressures and local interests. Moreover, with the rise in regional economic and political arrangements, 6 we also expect that regional forces mediate in the interplay between the global and local interests.
Understanding the process of foreign investment is particularly important in the case of post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Powerful international organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) view FDI as a catalyst in the transition to capitalism and a powerful force for integration of this region into the global economy. 7 FDI is reported to influence a host country's macroeconomic performance, including indicators like the balance of payments and employment. Moreover, foreign investors as the new owners of formerly state-owned enterprises have the skill and ability to induce corporate restructuring because they can provide needed financial resources as well as managerial and technological know-how. 8 Despite the advocated key role of FDI in the transition process, Figure 1 shows that the flows of foreign investment into Slovenia have been consistently lower than the average for the Central and East European region. How can we explain this trend? Existing research, focusing on the investor preferences, suggests that economic and political characteristics of a country determine the size of investments. 9 To maximize their profitability, investors choose locations that promise highest returns and minimize risk. Surprisingly, however, Slovenia is evaluated as (one of) the most developed and least risky among the Central Credit Ratings, and Standard and Poor. This suggests that country characteristics and investor preferences might not adequately explain the patterns of foreign investment into Slovenia. In contrast to the existing investor-centered research, this study redirects the attention to the reception processes and scrutinizes the intersection between the global, regional, and national forces to understand the patterns of foreign investment into Slovenia. Specifically, I tackle two issues that address foreign investment at the national and organizational levels of analysis, respectively. First, I examine foreign investment policy formulations, paying attention to how the Slovenian state institutionalizes its attitudes toward the presence of foreign actors in the national economy. Second, I am interested in how the official policies impact actual foreign investment transactions at the level
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Institutionalizing official attitudes toward foreign investment
Liberalizing its economy after the fall of state socialism, the Slovenian state adopted economic policies to regulate foreign investment into the country. While foreign investment policies are institutional measures designed to impact economic restructuring urged by the IMF, World Bank, and UNCTAD, these policies can also be viewed as mechanisms that institutionalize official national attitudes toward the presence of foreign actors in the national economy. How can we understand the mechanisms underlying the policy-making processes?
From the perspective of economics, which holds that universal economic laws structure social systems, all action evolves toward solutions that maximize their respective utility. Thus, in the case of public policy making, action aims at maximization of "the common good." Nation-states, as real, rational, and purposive actors, design foreign investment policies with a goal of ultimate efficiency. The economic perspective would predict that one policy alternative yields the most efficient outcome. Hence, we would not expect to see much variation in the policies across different transition countries, and Slovenia's foreign investment policy would be similar to those of her peer states in the region.
On the other hand, the conflict perspective pays attention to the competition among interest groups in a society as a determinant of policy choices. In this vein, interest groups with the most power and political resources decide the policies. According to the conflict perspective, foreign investment policies adopted by the Central and East European transition countries (and Slovenia) would reflect the interests of current political parties in power.
A third perspective is proposed by sociological neoinstitutionalists, who argue that existing organizational resources of actors facilitate the adoption of new policies that are isomorphic with those already in existence. 10 Initial neoinstitutional arguments were developed primarily to explain the isomorphic outcomes within organizational areas, but recent work in the world society perspective proposes that we conceive of nation-states as actors in a global arena who "enact scripts" supplied by the global culture and associational processes.
11
In contrast to neoclassical economic arguments, neoinstitutionalists propose that action is not primarily oriented toward efficiency but external legitimacy. Hence, national policy makers adopt policies that are defined as the most legitimate, that is, those that would enhance the cultural standing and membership of a particular society in the nation-state community. 12 Following the institutional perspective, some studies of policy making more visibly highlight the role of norms or culture and meaning. 13 Dobbin studies industrial policy making in the United
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States, Britain, and France and tries to explain why in the nineteen hundreds, these countries developed distinct industrial policies. From a culturalist stance, he argues that it was "the socially constructed logics of state action" 14 or their political cultures that influenced policy outcomes. Dobbin uses the example of the formulation of state policy with regard to railroad development in the United States, France, and Britain during the nineteenth century. While all three countries were comparable in terms of technological development, U.S. political institutions reinforced the value of community sovereignty, which resulted in weak national policy-making capacities. British institutions reinforced the value of individual sovereignty, protecting sovereign firms and individual entrepreneurs. The French placed a premium on state sovereignty and had technocrats in Paris devise a highly centralized national railway system. Overall, the decided railway policies were different because different countries followed fundamentally different logics and conceptions of rationality, persisting in their political culture once institutionalized. In sum, the culturalist perspective on policy making would imply that there is a great variation among policies adopted by Central and East European transition countries, reflecting their idiosyncratic political cultures.
Empirical evidence from a content analysis of foreign investment legislation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe reveals that states use a variety of measures to regulate inflows of foreign capital (Table 1 ). In fact, states seem to be negotiating between the neoliberal logic 15 of freely opening borders and providing incentives to foreign capital, on one hand, and economic nationalism and closing borders and discouraging foreign investment, on the other hand.
States move on the continuum between the two opposite poles when they institutionalize their "willingness" to accept foreign capital through a variety of official measures that either facil- itate or regulate FDI. Specifically, states can significantly interfere with the economic processes if they review every foreign investment attempt and require that state agencies issue official approvals for these attempts. Imposing sectoral restrictions, states can prevent foreign investment into those sectors that they deem should remain within national control, such as natural resources or military-related activities. States can also impose restrictions on profit repatriation by foreign investors.
Foreign Investment Policy in Central and
On the other hand, states can encourage foreign investment and even actively solicit it by offering special investment incentives that make their firms and investment locations more attractive than those in other countries. In this vein, states can adopt differential tax and tariff procedures for foreign firms by offering foreign investors tax breaks or exempting them from paying customs tariffs. In addition, the process of privatization of stateowned firms in post-socialism also offers ways of attracting FDI by privatizing to foreign investors.
Considering the proclamation of great benefits that FDI has for facilitating the transition to capitalism, the economic perspective grounded in the maximization of efficiency would most likely predict that all of the Central and East European countries would uniformly open their borders to foreign investment and enact liberal FDI policies. However, as Table 1 shows, in the first years of the transition there was great variation across different Central and East European countries, with some countries liberalizing their regimes more than others. This provides some evidence to argue that policies do not simply aim at efficiency. Rather, I suggest, policies also signal legitimacy and institutionalize official attitudes toward foreign ownership.
Comparing the extent of liberalization across eleven Central and East European countries in 1993, we can observe that the newly established states tend to be more protectionist than Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Slovenia in particular had a very restrictive foreign investment policy. It required a registration at the district court for every FDI transaction. In addition, most deals were subject to the approval by the Slovenian Privatization Agency. Furthermore, in the military equipment field, rail and air transport, communications and telecommunications, insurance, publishing, and mass media, wholly foreign-owned companies were not permitted. 16 These sectors all seem to be those where protecting domestic ownership might be considered crucial for maintaining national sovereignty. Moreover, the policy mandated that company directors be Slovenian citizens and that a majority of any board of directors be Slovenian citizens. 17 The idea of protecting the national ownership emanates from these official measures that can be seen as the institutionalization of economic nationalism.
Once formulated, the protectionist Slovenian foreign investment policy was not set in stone. In fact, it has been considerably amended since 1997. The Slovenians changed Article 68 of the Constitution, allowing foreigners to own land. Slovenia has also adopted its investment legislation to allow domestic and foreign investors equal rights to enter and exit business and to provide equal investment protection. Additionally, the country has liberalized its foreign exchange regime. It now allows free transfer of profits and repatriation of capital. It has also amended its tax law; with the company income tax set at 25 percent, it is considered one of the most tax-favorable countries in Europe.
18 Do these changes in policy reflect a drastic change in official national attitudes toward foreign ownership of domestic assets brought by a shift in political power? This is hardly the case since in the period from 1992 to 1997, there was no substantial change in the Slovenian political arena, with the Liberal Democratic Party remaining the majority leader. Rather, to understand the change in foreign investment policies, we need to look beyond the domestic politics and scrutinize the influence of regional forces in this process.
The changes in Slovenia's foreign investment policy can be viewed as necessitated by the "Europe Agreement" that Slovenia had to sign to begin with the European Union (EU) accession negotiations. The Europe Agreement, a "preaccession instru-
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Negotiating Global, Regional, and National Forces ment" asked for a commitment from the signing state to "approximate [its] legislation to that of the European Union . . . Europe Agreements also contain provisions regarding the free movement of services, payments and capital in respect of trade and investments, and the free movement of workers. When establishing and operating in the territory of the other party, enterprises must receive treatment not less favorable than national enterprises." 19 The Europe Agreement indicates the specific ways in which foreign investment policy in Slovenia had to be amended to comply with the EU legislation and prerogatives.
Amending policy, however, did not painlessly erase the national protectionist sentiments institutionalized in the Slovenian early foreign investment policy. In fact, a detailed investigation of the decision-making process that resulted in changing one crucial part of the foreign investment policy, the amendment to Article 68 of the Slovenian Constitution, provides insights into the negotiation of the local interests and regional pressures. A decision to amend Article 68 was a prerequisite to the signing of the Europe Agreement. Article 68 is a paragraph about the foreign ownership of land in Slovenia. As initially drafted in the Constitution, this article prohibited foreigners to own land in Slovenia. Its amendment would reverse the clause.
Amending the Constitution, yielding to coercive pressures
Upon its establishment of sovereignty and independence from Yugoslavia, in December 1991, Slovenia drafted its constitution with Article 68 claiming that "Foreigners cannot have ownership rights of land unless in cases of inheritance under conditions of reciprocity" (emphasis added). 20 After less than six years, on 24 June 1997, the Slovenian National Assembly voted with majority to begin the process of amending Article 68 and thus agreed to change its Constitution for the very first time. On July 14, after ten hours of debate, the National Assembly voted with strong major-
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ity to change Article 68 of its Constitution, which now reads, "Foreigners can acquire ownership rights on real estate under conditions specified by law or if so specifies an international contract ratified by the National Assembly under conditions of reciprocity" (emphasis added).
21
The initial proposal to change Article 68 came from the government for consideration by the National Assembly, mainly because this amendment would ensure that "Slovenia acquires a formal status to begin the process of negotiations to become a full member of the European Union," as then-Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler suggested in his address to the Assembly. The first to speak in the debate was then-Vice Prime Minister Marjan Podobnik. His speech, parts of which are quoted below, epitomizes a four-hour debate triggered by the proposal to begin the amendment of Article 68 and a ten-hour debate on the day when the actual amendment was proposed. The first few sentences lay out the two sides of the issue:
The Government suggested that National Assembly begins with the process of amendment of Article 68 of the Constitution, despite all questions that were and are being raised, and will be raised in the future regarding this issue. . . . It is of a vital interest, mostly for the Slovenian economy, that Slovenia joins the European Union as a full member as soon as possible, since our economy is in a large part connected with the countries of European Union. Of course, it is very important that, so called, "protective regulations," the protection of national public interest, is appropriately and well prepared . . .
The following passage describes the necessary trade off between the two alternatives:
Contemporary Europe, which was to be expected, intends to write a check to everybody who will want to share security and prosperity with her. It is a geo-political fact that the newly established states of Central and especially Eastern Europe can only delve into European ideals on their own account and to their own expense. We in Slovenia know that, and we are aware of that; we do not want to idealize the situation, and we decided to travel in this direction and toward such Europe as [this is] the best alternative that Slovenia in this moment confronts . . .
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The speaker makes additional calls to support the protection of national assets and preserve domestic ownership:
We ought to know that we need to enter Europe as protected as we can. Slovenia should not and must not waste its meager resources and geo-strategic advantages to inability, corruption, wild privatization . . . abuse of state budget, nor for buying European "liking" by importing its unemployment. It should focus on its own national development and get out of each of its advantages the most possible, and simultaneously protect its resources and preserve its assets . . .
The speaker ends with the dilemma exposed in the introduction:
[Are we] capable of finding the path which will lead us in the direction of European Union in a way that we can thread this path and be self confident and without fear that our vital national interests would be endangered?
22
In his speech, Vice Prime Minister Podobnik clearly identifies two sides of the issue raised if the state were to allow foreigners to own property in Slovenia. On one hand, Slovenia needs to join European Union if it wants to prosper economically-and to do that it must amend Article 68. On the other hand, Slovenia needs to protect its "vital national interests" and resources, including its land property. This situation reflects the simultaneous presence and tension between the forces of regionalism and nationalism, which are both summed up in the rhetoric of "rational interests." After all, as a representative of the Slovenian government, Podobnik is acting on behalf of a modern nation-state, and that, more or less, means advocating rational action by emphasizing socioeconomic development, national interest, or citizenship.
23
While realist theories suggest that such rationality and purposiveness is the true nature of policy-making process, constructivist accounts remind us that policy makers make claims as if universal laws existed and that ideas of universal laws and of instrumental rationality are cultural constructs. Thus, it is best to cast Podobnik's arguments in the rhetoric provided by the world society culture that constructs, legitimates, and propagates worldwide models of action.
25
In our specific case, Podobnik draws on two models: the idea of economic growth and prosperity and the idea of nation-state as the legitimate political unit and a sovereign actor. Specifically, he argues that Slovenia should make amends to be able to join the EU, which will ensure the country's economic prosperity, but at the same time, he calls for the protection of national assets. He frames "national interest" in two different ways, and in doing so he invokes two world models, regionalization and nationalization, that are at odds with each other. This substantiates the proposition that world culture is of an eclectic kind, encompassing models that are idealized and internally inconsistent. With such properties, world culture is not a uniform coherent whole but, rather, a cultural toolkit of world models, 26 which are fragmented and have loose linkages to each other so that actors can draw on distinctive and inconsistent models simultaneously. 27 Hence, actors select from the available cultural elements to construct what they define as viable strategies of action.
The concept of world cultural repertoire helps explain why both models (even though at odds with each other) are invoked as legitimate rational interests, but it does not explain why one
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Negotiating Global, Regional, and National Forces , culture acquired during socialization, is an exogenous force providing "value orientations" coherent across social groups. In sharp contrast, recent work highlights a fragmentation of culture perspective, pointing to inconsistency in the manifestation of culture across groups and situations. The most commonly used image employed in cultural analysis today is that of "culture as a 'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems" (Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," 273). According to Swidler, "people may have in readiness cultural capacities that they rarely employ . . . and know more culture that they use." Research on memory confirms that people retain in their memory almost every image or idea with which they come in contact. People's cultural toolkits thus consist of a variety of elements with loose linkages to each other. Such fragmentation enables people to "maintain distinctive and inconsistent action frames" and to "participate in multiple cultural traditions, even when those traditions contain inconsistent elements" (Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997):
alternative (economic prosperity ensured by membership in the EU) is voted for by the great majority in National Assembly and why, consequently, the decision to allow foreigners to own property in Slovenia takes priority over protecting national ownership. If both these myths are socially constructed and neither is inherently superior, was the tipping of the scale in favor of joining the EU arbitrary? To understand why the great majority voted for the constitutional amendment, we should consider the path dependency of institutional outcomes, whereby the decision to adapt to the EU policies depended on a previously attained consensus that Slovenia should join the EU. In the document Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2000) issued by the Slovenian Foreign Ministry, it is clearly stated that "the integration of Slovenia into the European Union is a prerequisite for further development, prosperity and security of the Slovenian state and its citizens" (emphasis added).
28
In fact, one can say that "EU attachment" was institutionalized in 1990 during Slovenia's independence movement with the main slogan "Evropa zdaj!" (Europe now!), which emphasized the sharp differences between former Yugoslavian goals of centralization and nationalism (of Serbs primarily) and Slovenia's (and Croatia's) proposals to integrate the country into European institutions. As Caratan points out, this political divergence was one of the key factors that led to the breakup of the Yugoslavian federation.
29
In this context, Slovenia's policy makers saw joining the EU as the logical course of action. Institutionalized national political culture structured the alternatives imagined and considered plausible. However, on the way to achieving their institutionalized goal, Slovenia stumbled over an obstacle once the associational pressures for compliance with the EU policies were suddenly at odds with the nation-building process occurring simultaneously in a newly established nation-state. This is clear from the fact that the majority of the speakers in the constitutional amendment debate drew on the nation-building discourse and invoked notions of "national identity," urged for "the protection of national interests," and urged for caution from "the potential danger to key national assets" and "pressures to yield to the foreigners." As one Assembly speaker asserted, "Slovenes have never sold their land so easily. . . . Such law poses a great danger, in fact, we are opening the door to the whole world!" 30 However, the National Assembly speakers also seem to be generally aware that national protective interests needed to be put aside for the sake of future economic prosperity brought about by EU membership. Although the protectionist framing of the national interest was equally plausible, the economic prosperity framing of the national interest was considered more legitimate because it coincided with the values institutionalized in the national political culture. This finding highlights the importance of paying attention to the interaction between the world society culture and the national cultural repertoires and exploring their nestedness when investigating policy outcomes in the globalizing world.
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The evidence mustered thus far suggests that the main reasons for the initial change in the Slovenian foreign investment policy were pressures to comply with the EU legislation. These pressures were contradictory to the equally plausible goal of protecting the national assets in domestic ownership but were considered more legitimate because they were path dependent upon values historically institutionalized in the Slovenian national political culture.
Nevertheless, the adjustment to the European policy was not a straightforward decision. The selected course of action, a way of economic prosperity provided by the EU, coincided both with the national political culture and the global world culture, but it still took fourteen hours of debate before the vote! Many speakers in the National Assembly expressed sentiments of disappointment or were upset that Slovenia did not have much or any negotiating power. If it wanted to start the EU membership
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negotiations, it had to fully adjust its foreign ownership of land clause. It could not bargain or ask for an extension.
31
As the vice prime minister said, it could "only delve into European ideals on [its] own account and to [its] own expense." With regard to these circumstances, it is necessary to bring into the explanatory framework the stratification of the economic and political power as well as prestige among nation-states. While most neoinstitutionalists recognize and agree that world political economy is marked by unequal distribution of power and capital, they do "pay more attention to the socially constructed character of the entities and processes under consideration." 32 But when the focus is not only on converging outcomes and enactment of scripts, power of actors becomes a salient issue. Institutionalization of national policies should be understood as influenced as much by isomorphic tendencies within the world society as by the relative power of nation-states in a stratified world political economy. Meyer and his coauthors state in passing that "the poor and weak and peripheral copy the rich and strong and central." 33 But as the parliamentary debate in the Slovenian case shows, the peripheral actors are not unaware of this power distribution. Slovenians could have gone their own way (and preserved property to national ownership), but in the interconnected world of associational "elite clubs," they could not afford it. They had no choice but to conform. They were coerced into it. Hence, at the nation-state level, the notion of coercive isomorphism 34 provides a conceptual framing for the analysis that draws both on the neoinstitutional concepts of iso- When analyzing how nations respond to global foreign investment, as revealed through the policies they institutionalize, we need to also take into account these power relations.
Translating policy into practice
If we argue that coercive pressures of regionalization dictated the change of national foreign investment policy in Slovenia, we also need to consider that these policies may not be successfully implemented in practice. As neoinstitutionalists propose, the adoption of policy measures as a consequence of isomorphizing with the external world may exemplify "the decoupling" of policies and practice. 36 Such a gap between policy and practical implementation is likely when nation-states adopt formal rules that, although legitimated by world society culture, cannot be straightforwardly imported into their systems. 37 In addition, adoption of policy does not immediately translate into successful policy implementation. For example, states with weak institutional capacities may emphasize the formal structuration but lack the power to make the policies work effectively. Alternatively, because they were externally pressured to adopt "unwanted" policies, even states with strong institutional capacities might not be interested in making these policies work effectively since, in the gap between formal rules and practice, they can squeeze the domestic nationalist interests they had to formally give up. In case of Slovenia, one can say that the National Assembly voted to
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38
These added specifications allow for much manipulation of the written foreign ownership of land rule. It is plausible that such wording is an intended consequence meant to sanction and facilitate the decoupling of formal policies and actual practices and thus help negotiate the simultaneous regional pressures and national interests.
As a trend depicted in Figure 2 shows, the formally more liberal foreign investment policy as a result of changes in the late 1997 did not increase the foreign investment flows into Slovenia in the years after 1997. This could not be a result of a declining overall investment in the region, since foreign investment in the Central and Eastern Europe shows an upward trend. Rather, this empirical evidence may substantiate how formal regulations do not necessarily translate into practice.
Conditionality specified in legal provisions allows for selectivity and differentiation between foreign investments. That there are variations between formal rules and investment practice was also suggested to me in an interview with a high-ranking official at the Central and East European Privatization Network. He pointed out that often negotiations of investments in Central and Eastern Europe are done on a case-by-case basis at the organizational level whereby seriously interested investors can bypass some of the legal regulations set at the host-country level. Also, the state or local governments can make special amends for the investments they really want to attract. 39 Concurrently, this would suggest that the state and local governments can block certain investments that are not considered desirable.
A case of a foreign petroleum company with intentions to invest in Slovenia substantiates this speculation. While the inves-
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38. Amendment to the Slovenian Constitution, Article 68, 1997. 39. Based on a personal interview, 10 January 1999.
tor has been able to buy the land, after the Article 68 amendment, it wanted to build a gas station on it. However, the national regulations mandate that after the land is acquired, investors, be they domestic or foreign, need to apply for a location permit and a building permit before they start construction. At the completion of construction, the investor needs to get an operation permit. Acquiring all these permits is a highly bureaucratized procedure that may have its roots in a former socialist state planning of the economy. For example, the location documentation (i.e., all the documents needed to be submitted to get a location permit) involves multiparty clearances by up to twenty-two local and state authorities and substantial documentation by investors. The process takes several months. An operation permit requires a minimum of thirty documents and again takes several months to be issued. resents a great uncertainty to the investor but also allows for many grounds (relevant and/or irrelevant) to refuse the permit by the authorities, which is precisely what happened to this petroleum company. After the local authorities found their application incomplete several times, prolonging the investment process for many months, the investor decided to sell the land and move to another location, outside Slovenia.
41
It is hard to pinpoint precisely why this foreign investor ran into so many bottlenecks and procedural hurdles. It is possible, but of course not publicly acknowledged, that the major Slovenian petroleum company used its political alliances in the local administration that was handling the foreign investment case to rule out the competition.
The implied conditionality in the amended Article 68 as well as a myriad of bureaucratic regulations concerning foreign investment suggest that policies are not simply regulating the economic activity but are, moreover, used as resources that enable some economic actors to pursue their preferred lines of action. The types of policies that state actors adopt in respect to foreign investment are simultaneously regulatory and constitutive of action. 42 On one hand, economic policies regulate/constrain economic processes because they impose rules on economic activity. On the other hand, policies constitute/enable action because, in practice, they can be used as resources to empower economic actors to pursue preferred lines of action.
The nontransparent nature of administrative rules and procedures may be a vestige of a historically institutionalized economic organization of a particular setting, which reflects the taken-for-granted ways of how economic activity takes place in that particular context, who the legitimate actors are, and how they should relate to each other. 43 Thus, in a post-socialist setting,
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it might be considered normal and appropriate to find ways to circumvent official rules and use political alliances and social ties to pursue desired economic goals. 44 Since institutional logics are deeply rooted in collective understandings and practices, they are resilient to changing cultural circumstances. This might explain why practices established during one political regime would persist after the regime's fall. Like the investment policies discussed above, these historically institutionalized ways of economic organization, and concomitant shared cultural understandings of economic life, have regulatory and constitutive impacts on economic processes. They put constraints on economic action, but at the same time they are "repositories of distinctive capabilities that allow economic actors to pursue some activities in the global economy more successfully than others." 45 Understanding social organization of national economies helps explain how economic actors negotiate between domestic and global forces.
Practice of foreign investment
While official attitudes toward foreign investment are likely decoupled from the practical economic transactions at the level of business firms, this decoupling does not result in a random activity of foreign investment. In fact, data from the Slovenian National Bank and the Agency for Trade and Investment Promotion suggest that foreign investment in Slovenia is highly patterned by the investor's country of origin. As Table 2 shows, the majority of the investment in Slovenia comes from Austria. While economists might explain this by low costs of transportation and communication due to proximity, it is suspicious why the Italian investment-with Italy being just as close as Austria and with an even higher propensity to invest abroad 46 -constitutes only a
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47
Thus, it is more likely that the reasons for a high share of Austrian investment have to do with historical cultural affinities and preexisting personal and business ties with Slovenians, which are used to negotiate investment transactions. 48 In fact, according to a survey of foreign investment firms in Slovenia, prior business cooperation and business contacts were the key reason for these firms to choose investment locations in Slovenia. Interestingly, the survey results also showed that investment decisions were never based solely on market analysis calculations. 49 Moreover, one needs to take into account that FDI does not only involve a transfer of foreign capital but also a transfer of a lasting interest in an acquired company. This lasting interest implies a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the host company. Knowing that management practices are not universal but culturally specific, 50 we can infer that conceptions of management might be very discrepant between a host and an investor. On these grounds, hosts might be more welcoming to investments that they consider closer to their cultural values and practices and resist those that are perceived as culturally distant.
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Reception of an attempt by an American household appliances manufacturer to buy a majority share in a Slovenian company provides an illustrative example that highlights the influence of personal and business ties as well as cultural understanding of managerial practices in determining where FDI transactions occur. An initial contact between the American and Slovenian firm was established already in 1970 when the Slovenian firm had a representative office in the United States. The American firm expressed interest in investing in Rotor, the Slovenian firm, but could not follow through with its investment attempt due to the closed socialist political regime in Yugoslavia. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the negotiations between Rotor's top management and the American firm resumed but were stopped by the middle management of Rotor, who mobilized the workers and launched a local news campaign against the Americans. In the news, they alluded to "the American way of doing business" as not caring about the workers and mercilessly downsizing, and they labeled the American investment attempt as "a hostile takeover." 51 Not wanting to be perceived as having negative inten-
478
Negotiating Global, Regional, and National Forces tions, Americans withdrew their offer and later decided to invest in the Czech Republic, where they encountered no opposition. On the other hand, within a year, half of Rotor was quietly bought by a German multinational with long-term business ties to Rotor. The decision to invest was promoted by a former top manager of Rotor who personally knew top executives at the German firm and saw the buyout as an opportunity to secure himself a top position in a foreign-owned company. This came part and parcel with the investment transaction.
52

Conclusion
Foreign investment in Central and East European countries is based too much on emotional prejudices and daily political needs and is far from rational economic considerations. 53 As captured in the above quote, my study of foreign investment in Slovenia shows that the process is not one of straightforward economic calculation. Rather, foreign investment transactions are shaped by social forces. As a macroeconomic process, foreign investment is situated in a broader framework of state relations. Evidence presented in this study shows that Slovenia, as a transition country in Central and Eastern Europe, responds to the global neoliberalist agenda. As a state applying for the accession to the EU, Slovenia is also compelled to respond to specific EUimposed demands to change its foreign investment policies. At the same time, as a newly established state, Slovenia tries to assert its sovereignty and protect its national interests. Caught in between these forces of globalization, regionalization, and nationalization, the state institutionalizes liberal foreign investment policies and adopts legislation to open its property assets to foreign investors.
However, the actual foreign investment inflows into the country suggest that institutionalized measures do not exert a significant influence on the incoming investment levels. As this study
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52. This case study is based on the evidence collected from interviews with the management of Rotor and news articles. All names are fictional for confidentiality. 53. Dunning and Rojec, Foreign Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, 12. proposes, the economic practice is decoupled from formal rules. While it is plausible that the practice of bypassing state regulation is a result of a state with weak institutional capabilities, 54 Slovenia as a former state-socialist country has a strong state history. Thus, as this article puts forward, decoupling is to a certain degree strategic. State actors sanction decoupling to negotiate between conflicting domestic interests and coercive regional pressures. Moreover, actors involved in actual economic transactions exploit the institutional nontransparency and follow the logic of economic organization that renders circumvention of official rules and use of political alliances and social ties as legitimate strategies to pursue desired economic goals. In practice, economic actors also differentiate between potential exchange partners by relying on cultural affinities and preexistent relations.
While the international organizations might promote the decisive role of the foreign investment policies in attracting investment into Central and Eastern Europe, the evidence from this study suggest that in fact, implementing more or less permissive foreign investment policies in the Central and East European transition economies might not bring about the proclaimed impact. Based on the qualitative analysis, I put forward a hypothesis about substantial decoupling of policies and practice in the transition countries. Further research needs to test, more generally, how and to what extent formal provisions are countermanded by the influence of personal and business ties, political alliances, and cultural affinities. What this study proposes is that any inquiry into economic processes would be importantly enriched if it set out to uncover their embeddedness in institutions, politics, culture, and networks, paying close attention to the negotiation between the global, regional, and national forces.
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